SITUATION III: INSURGENCY AND CIVIL STRIFE-PROTECTION OF SHIPS OF THIRD STATES by unknown
International Law Studies—Volume 38 
International Law Situations 
With Solutions and Notes 
U.S. Naval War College (Editor) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. 
Government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College. 
SITUATION III 
INSURGENCY AND CIVIL STRIFE-PROTEC-
TION OF SHIPS OF THIRD STATES 
There is in state Ban armed atten1pt of party C, 
the Commoners, to obtain control of the established 
government of state B and the Commoners have ob-
tained military control of one-half of state B and 
the ports in that area. Armed vessels of state B 
and of the Commoners are cruising off the coast. 
Vessels of war of other states are also cruising off 
the coast u11der instructions to maintain the rights 
of their nationals. Such provisions as those 
of the Non-Intervention Scheme of Observation, 
March 8, 1937, bind states D, E, F, and G. Such 
provisions as those of the Joint Resolution of the 
United States, May 1, 1937, bind states F, G, H, 
and I,_and states D, E, H, and I were bound by the 
Nyon Agreement of September 14, J937. All states 
were parties to the submarine warfare rules of 
1930. 
(a) The Feran, a merchant vessel, lawfully fly-
ing the flag of state F,"bound for port R, which is 
under the control of state B, with a cargo of unas-
sembled aircraft parts, is met 10 Iniles off the coast 
by the Cape, a cruiser flying the flag of the Com-
moners. The Cape sends a small boat with three 
1nen toward the Feran after it had sun1moned the 
Fe~ran to come to and to submit to capture on the 
ground that this action is in accord with the Joint 
Resolution of May 1,1937. The Fera1t asks by radio 
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for instructions or aid from the Fona, a nearby 
cruiser of state F. 1. What are the legal rights~ 
2. Would the rights be the same if the summons had 
been by a cruiser of state B ~ 
(b) The Iris, a 111erchant vessel lawfully flying 
the flag of state I, with a cargo of barbed wire, is 
met by a submarine which does 11ot disclose its 
identity,. but orders the crew to take to the boats 
and row to fishing vessels which are in the vicinity 
as the Iris will be sunk after ten mil1utes. The Iris 
asks by radio for instructions or aid fro1n the I ona., 
a nearby cruiser of state I. 1. What are the legal 
rights~ 2. Would the rights be the same if the 
submarine had been under the flag of the Com-
moners~ 3. Would the rights be the same if the 
submarine had been under the flag of state D ~ 
(c) The Gyra, an oil tanker lawfully flyi11g the 
flag of state G, armed "for the preservation of dis-
cipli11e," is met 10 miles off the coast by the Ba1~n, 
a cruiser of state B. The Bai1L summons the Gyra 
to come to for visit and search and as the small boat 
fron1 the Bai1L comes alongside, the crew of the 
Gyra drive it off with the ar111s on board. The 
Bain then signals that it is about to sink the Gy1·a. 
The Gyra asks by radio for instructions or aid from 
the Geno, a nearby cruiser of state G. 1. What are 
the legal rights~ 2. Would the rights be the same 
if the SU1n1nons was bv a cruiser of the Commoners~ 
oJ 
In each of the above cases should a nearby cruiser 
of state H take any action if specially requested b)r 
the merchant vessels~ 
SOLUTION 
(a) The Fo1La should notify the Feran that it is 
coming to its aid to protect it against an illegal act. 
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The Fo1~a also should notify the Cape that the lat- ' 
ter bas no right to interfere 'vith the Feran and 
should tl1reaten the llse of force against the Ca1Je 
if it refuses to desist. The rights 'YOllld be the same 
if the sum1nons bad bee11 by a cruiser of state B. 
(b) The I o1~a should notify the !Tis to try to 
escape and should notify the Stlbmarine that it bas 
110 rights in this situation and that force will be 
used against it for the protection of the Iris. If 
the Io1~a arrives before the It·1·s is actt1ally attacked 
it should drive off the submari11e by force, a11d if 
it reaches the place of attack too late to save the 
lr1~s, it should cotlnter-attack the Stlbmarine. The 
rights 'Nould be the same if the sub1narine had 
been under the flag of the Commoners or that of 
state D. 
(c) The Geno should notify the Gyra to cease its 
resistance and should notify the Bai1~ that the lat-
ter has no right either to visit and search or· to sink 
the Gyra and shot1ld threaten force to compel it to 
desist. The rights 'vould be same if the summons 
was by a cruiser of the eonnnoners. 
The cruiser of state H should take 110 actio11 in 
the case of the Feran. In the case of the Iris it 
may intervene and may counter-attack and destroy 
the submarine. In the case of the Gyra, if it 'vit-
11esses the attack, it may intervene to protect the 
Gyra but has no authority to counter-attack or 
destroy the Bain. 
The Spant.sh Civil Strije-Ge1~eral.-The situ-
atioll in state B 'vhere the Commoners are ell-
gaged in an attempt to obtain control of the 
established government is obviously very similar to 
the legal state of affairs prevailing in Spain from 
Jt1ly 1936 to 1939. The regular rules of belliger-
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ency do not apply, for no war exists in the legal 
sense. Technically it is a condition of insurgency 
only. Third states are 110t subject to the obliga-
tions of neutrality under general internatio11allaw 
and the t'vo contestants do not possess belligerent 
rights. In both the Spa11ish caf?e a11d in this 
Situation III, however, outside po\vers have 
adopted special n1easures which have no precedent 
in international law. The effect of these acts is to 
put the two parties upon the same basis, treating 
them both alike. In operation, therefore, these 
special provisions, in principle, are akin to neu-
trality. The result has been highly anomalous, for 
third states have assumed an attitude of impar-
tiality and have taken upon themselves certain 
obligations when there \vas really no war, no call 
for neutrality, and when under . normal circum-
stances fhe established, recognized government 
would be~ntitled to friendly support as prescribed 
by the laws of peace.. Solution to the problems 
must be sought upon the basis of the usual rules 
of insurgency and the particular conventions and 
regulations adopted for this conflict. The \vords 
"civil strife" have been used advisedly_ since "civil 
\var" would imply the existence of a state of 
belligerency, a legal condition recognized neither in 
Spain nor in state B. 
Mariti11~e rules d~tri1~g ins~trge?~cy.-During ill-
~urgency neither the government nor the insurg~1t 
·forces have the right to visit and search shi s of 
third states or to make seizures on the custo]!ill!L_ 
grou11ds of contraband, blockade a11d' unneutral 
service. Within territorial waters both parties 
may prevent supplies from reaching their oppo-
nent. This righ! of barring access gives 110 au-
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thority to se!_zEL _QP destroy foreign ships. The 
IDslirgent or government cruiser in such cases may 
direct the ship to a certain port where the supplies 
may be seized or may remove them from the ship 
provided compensation is rendered. 
This subject of the rights of the parties in in-
surgency has frequently been discussed in Naval 
War College Situations, the most famous of these 
being that of 1902 when the fllndamental principles 
were laid down. 
No right of confiscation or destruction of foreign property 
in such circumstances (in territorial waters) could 'veil be 
recognized and any act of injury so committed against for-
eigners would necessarily be at the risk of insurgents * * * 
their only right being * * * to prevent the access of 
supplies to their domestic enemy. The exercise of this power 
is restricted to the precise end to be accomplished. (Naval 
War C'ollege Situation, 1902, p. 80.) 
Insurgents actually having before the port of the state 
against which they are in insurrection, a force sufficient, if 
belligerency had been recognized, to maintain an international 
la'v blockade, may not be materially able to enforce the con-
ditions of a true blockade upon foreign vessels upon the high 
seas, even though they be approaching the port. Within the 
territorial limits of the country, their right to prevent the 
access of supplies to their enemy is practically the same on 
'vater as on land-a defensive act in the line of hostility to 
the enen1y. (Ibid, p. 82.) 
So far as territorial "\"Vaters are concerned, both the de jure 
and the de facto governments are entitled to take defensive 
measures within the waters adjoining the coast which they 
respectively occupy, but any such action is taken entirely 
under the Inunicipal la'v and has nothing 'vhatever to do 
"~ith belligerent rights. (British Year book of International 
Law·, 1937, p. 27.) 
Positio1~ of third states during insurgency.-
When legally there is no war, third states are nq_t 
neutral,_and the governments of third states are 
·-
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governed by the customary la,vs of peace in their 
relation 'vitl1 the established gov~rnment. Foreig11 
governments, therefore, may legally sell arms to_ 
the recognized gov~rnment but may not do so tQ_ 
the insurgents, for such an act would be ta11ta-
1nou-nt to i11tervention. The existence of ill_§Ur-
gency rather than belligerency tends to be more 
favorable to the constituted authorities than to_the 
revoltitio11ists. This is logical enough consideri11g 
the fact that peace still prevails. The Havana 
Conventio11 of 1928 on Rights and Duties of States 
i11 Civil Strife formally recognizes this favoring of 
the regular government. 
ARTICLE 1. 'I'he contracting states bind themselves * * * 
to forbid the traffic in arms and war material, except when 
intended for the government, while the belligerency of the 
rebels has not been recognized, in which latter case the rules 
of neutrality shall be applied. 
ARTICLE 3. The insurgent vessel, 'vhether a warship or a 
merchantinan, equipped by the rebels, 'vhich arrives at a 
foreign country or seeks refuge therein, shall be delivered by 
the govern1nent of the latter to the constituted government 
of the state in civil strife. (U. S. Treaty Series, No. 814.) 
Unless there is a don1estic law to the co11trar).2 
private persons may sell arms and supplies, at their 
o'vn risk, to either side in cases of insurgency. The 
obligations of neutrality con1e i11to the picture only 
'vhen a state like the United States forbids the fit-
ting out and armil1g of expeditio11s on beh~If of 
either co11testant. (The Three Friends, 166 U. S. 
1.) To this limited extent, where expeditions are • 
involved, third states are really neutral. 
I1~s~trgency a1td blockade.-It has long been clear 
that neither the government nor the rebel forces 
has the right to establish a blockade as long as there 
is only insurgency. The parent government may 
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declare certain ports closed but must enforce that 
order by effectiv,e means within the three mile 
limit. What may look, therefore, like a regular 
blockade, is legally only an act of enforcement for 
a domestic decree. The rights of third states upon 
the high seas are unaffected. It has been held that 
such closures n1ust be ''effective,'' the criterion of 
a belligerent blockade thus appearing somewhat 
paradoxically in what is technically a peacetime 
situation. (See Oriental Navigation Co. Claim, 
U. S.-Mexico General Claims Commission, 1928, 
Opinions of Commissioners, 1929, p. 23.) 
This rule that parent state orders of closure 
must be enforced is a mid\vay measure bet\veen two 
other possibilities. One of these would be that the 
lJarent state could close a port by simple decree, 
just as it could if there were no revolt, without any 
requirement that the order be supported by effec-
tive force. Some who reject this proposition con-
tend that if the pare11t govern1nent wishes to pre-
vent access to ports held by revolutionists, it must 
1·ecognize the belligerency of the opposition, that is, 
the peculiar status of a blockade which is not a 
blockade should be discarded. Practice ho\vever, 
is still along the lines of "effective" closure with-
out belligerency. (For a clear discussion of these 
matters see I-I. Briggs, "The La\v of N atio11s," pp. 
745-749.) 
Blockade i1~ the Spanish c,ivil strife.-Early in 
the conflict, the Spanish "Loyalist" government 
declared that certai11 ports in the hands of the 
rebels constituted a "war zone.'' In its reply to 
this announcement the America11 government 
stated that it could not admit the legality of such 
action unless the Spanish government maintained 
·-
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an "effective" blockade. The legalline.s in this sit-
uation 'vere not clear. Was the Spanish Govern-
ment issuing a closure order in the usual sense dis-
cussed above~ It declared a '',var zone~,, but the 
United States replied in terms of a blockade. If 
the government decree was a real blockade order, 
then it should have been treated as a recognition of 
belligerency as was Lincoln's blockade measure in 
1861. (The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635.) If it was 
not a blockade order, the United States should have 
answered in terms of the customary closure rules. 
The normal legal distinctions were thus blurred, a 
situation far from unusual in the whole story of 
the Spanish strife. ' 
Could General Franco, the insurgent, ''blockade'' 
Loyalist ports~ By their actions outsid·e powers 
admitted that be could intercept and interfere with 
the commerce of third states within the 3-mile 
limit. This 'vas true both at Bilbao and at Barce-
lona, and his actions there were in conformity "\Vith 
those usually allo,ved to insurgents, as described in 
connection with the Naval War College Situation 
of 1902 above. 
On August 21 Mr. Eric C. Wendelin, in charge of the 
American Embassy in ~1adrid, received a note verbale, dated 
August 20, 1936, from the Spanish Foreign Office at Madrid 
'vhich stated: 
''Spanish ports in the power of the rebels as well as those 
of Ceuta and Melilla and the ports of our proscription zone in 
~forocco, Balearic and Canary Islands, have all been declared 
a 'var zone and therefore it is not possible for the ships of our 
fleet to permit the entry into them of merchant ships in order 
in this way to prevent furnishing of provinces of Almeria, 
Murcia, Alicante, and Badajoz and supplies to the rebels." 
The Spanish Foreign Office requested that this information 
be transmitted to the American Government in order that 
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American merchant ships may be \Yarned and that thus "pos-
sible incidents may be avoided." 
Mr. Wendelin reported that he believed that the same com-
munication had been sent to all other governments. 
The Secretary of State, on August 25, instructed Mr. 
Wendelin to address the following note to the Minister of 
State in reply to the Minister's note verbale of August 20: 
"Sir: 
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note 
of August 20, 1936, requesting me to inform my Govern-
ment, in order that American merchant ships might be 
warned and possible incidents thus avoided, that your Gov-
ernment has declared Spanish ports in control of the in-
surgents, both on the Spanish mainland and in Morocco 
and the Balearic and Canary Islands, a war zone into which 
merchant vessels will not be permitted to enter. 
"l\1y Government directs me to inform you in reply that, 
with the friendliest feelings toward the Spanish Govern-
ment, it cannot admit the legality of any action on the part 
of the Spanish Government in declaring such ports closed 
unless that Government declares and maintains an effective 
blockade of such ports. In taking tllis position my Govern-
ment is guided by a long line of precedents in international 
law with which the Spanish Government is doubtless 
familiar." (Press Releases, Vol. XV, No. 361.) 
November 17, 1936, General Franco announced his in ten-
tion. of stopping the traffic in arms and munitions to 
Barcelona. His note to the Powers said : 
"The scandalous traffic in arms, ammunition, tanks, air-
planes, and even toxic gases, which is being carried on 
through the port of Barcelona is well known. All this ma-
terial is being transported to this port in ships flying dif-
ferent flags whose real nationality in its greater part is 
Russian or Spanish. 
"The National Government, being resolved to prevent this 
traffic with every means of war at its disposal \vill even go 
so far, if this were necessary, as to destroy that port. 
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"Therefore, it 'varns all foreign ships anchored in that 
harbor of the desirability of abandoning it in a very short 
time to avoid the consequences of damage which, uninten-
tionally, might be caused to them on the occasion of the 
military action referred to of 'vhich no further warning 
"~ill be given." (London Times, Nov. 20, 1936.) 
I1~s~trgent vessels and pi'racy.-Despite the court 
decisio11 in the famous case of the Ambrose Light 
(25 F. 408) in the last century, insurgent craft 
on the high seas or in territorial 'vaters are not 
pirates. 
The declaration of piracy against vessels which have risen 
in arms, e1nanating fron1 a government, is not binding upon 
the other states. (Habana Convention 1928, op. cit., Art. 2.) 
An insurgent government is regarded as possessing suffi-
cient responsibility to prevent its naval officers from being 
pirates ''hen they conform to the laws of war, even though 
their actions may be illegal hecause they are not properly 
qualHied to exercise belligerent functions. (British Year-
book of International Law, 1938, pp. 203-204.) 
illegal actions upon the high seas are therefore 
not syno11ymous vvith piracy. A state or a revo-
lutionary group can be :P.eld responsible for the 
unlawful acts of its vessels, and though often the 
epithet of piracy is hurled at some grossly unlaw-
ful act co1nmitted by a belligerent or an insurgent 
at sea, the terminology is moral1-aather than legal. 
Piracy in the legal sense is a special form of con-
current jurisdiction under which the 'varships of 
all states on the higl1 seas have the at1thority to 
seize pirate vessels, piracy consisting of an act of 
violence for a private end outside the authority of 
any political group or govern1nent. 
Harvard draft code and piracy.-ARTICLE 3. Piracy is 
any of the following acts, committed in a place not within 
the territorial jurisdiction of any state. 
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1 . .i!ny act of violence or of depredation con11nitted with 
intent to rob, rape, ''ound, enslave, ilnprison or kill a person 
or 'vith intent to steal or destroy property, for private ends 
'vithout bona fide purpose of asserting a claim of right, pro-
Yided that the act is connected 'vith an attack on or from. the 
sea or in or from the air. If the act is connected with an 
attack 'vhich starts from on board ship, either that ship or 
another ship which is involved must be a pirate ship or a ship 
without national character. 
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of 
a ship with knowledge of facts which make it a pirate ship. 
3. Any act of instigation or o:f intentional facilitation of an 
act described in paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of this article. 
(A1nerican Journal of International Law, 1932, Supplement, 
p. 743.) 
The Nyo1~ an~ Geneva a1~~ra,nge11~e1~ts.-Because 
of the many attacks upon. merchant shipping in 
the Mediterranean by m1identified submarines dul'-
ing the course of the Spanish conflict in 1937, the 
French and English governments took the initia-
tive in formulating special arrangements for deal-
ing "\vith this situation. At Nyon and at Geneva 
agreements \Vere framed vvhich gave to the vvar-
ships of the participating powers special rights not 
accorded by customary international lavv. The 
Nyon arrangement in its preamble stated that these 
submarine attacks ''should be justly treated as acts 
of piracy." This statement, hovvever, did not 
legally confer the status of pi.racy upon submarines 
making unlawflll attacks. "Illegal" not "pirati-
cal'' was the proper term to apply to the actions of 
the undersea craft. These arrangements dealt 
"\vith the n1ethod of coping vvith a particularly 
ftagra11t violation of the rights of innocent ships. 
It should be reme1nbered that even a visit and 
search conducted in the lavvful manner \Vould have 
been illegal since there "\Vas no belligerency. What 
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these arrangements did \vas to confer upon the 
\Varships of the participating states the right to 
deal drastically \vith any interference which in-
volved a violation of the legal rules in regard to 
visit and search. Under the general law \Varships 
of third powers may intervene to protect their own 
vessels from any sort of molestation. By the Nyon 
and Geneva arrangements any \varship could in-
tervene to protect any non-Spanish ship and \vas 
e11powered even to counter-attack and, if possible, 
to destroy the submarine. This last grant of au-
thority goes beyond the usual regulations which 
pern1it a reasonable use of force to protect a vessel 
but \vhich do not permit the use of force beyond 
that required for saving the attacked vessel. These 
arrangements \Vere designed to handle an illegality 
\vi thin an illegality, that is, they were framed with 
the aim of preventing an illegal method of conduct-
ing \vhat was in any event an illegal operation. 
Belligerent rights were not granted by these agree-
Inents which did ?Lot imply that lawful methods 
\Vould legalize action inconsistent with a condition 
of insurgency. 
,.IHE N YON ARRANGEl\IENT, SEPTEl\IBER 14, 1937 
\Vhereas arising out of the Spanish conflict attacks have 
been repeatedly conunitted in the Mediterranean by sub-
marines against 1nerchant ships not belonging to either of 
the conflicting Spanish parties; and 
Whereas these attacks are violations of the rules of inter-
nationalla'v referred to in Part IV of the Treaty of London 
of April 22, 1930 with regard to the sinking of merchant 
ships and constitute acts contrary to the most elementary 
dictates of humanity, which should be justly treated as 
acts of piracy; and 
'\Vhereas "'~ithout in any ·way admitting the right of either 
party to the conflict in Spain to exercise belligerent rights 
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or to interfere \Vith merchant ships on the high seas even 
if the laws of warfare at sea are observed and without 
prejudice to the right of any participating Po\ver to take 
such action as may be proper to protect its merchant ship-
ping from any kind of interference on the high seas or to 
the possibility of further collective 1neasures being agreecl 
upon subsequently, it is necessary in the first place to agree. 
upon certain special collective measures against piratical 
acts by submarines: 
(a) Except as stated in (b) and (c) belo,v, no sub1narine 
will be sent to sea within the Mediterranean. 
(b) Submarines may proceed on passage after notifica-
tion to the other participating Po,vers, provided that they 
proceed on the surface and are acco1npanied by a surface 
ship. 
(c) Each participating Power reserves for purposes of 
exercises certain areas defined in Annex I hereto in which 
its submarines are exempt from the restrictions 1nentioned 
in (a) or (b). 
The participating Powers further undertake not to allow 
the presence in their respective territorial waters of any 
foreign submarines except in case of urgent distress, or 
"·here the conditions prescribed in sub-paragraph (b) above 
are fulfilled. 
VI: The participating Po,vers also agree that, in order 
to simplify the proble1n involved in carrying out the meas-
ures above described, they may severally advise their nler-
chant shipping to follow certain main routes in the Medi-
terranean agreed upon between them and defined in Annex 
II hereto. 
'TII. Nothing in the present agreement restricts the right 
of any participating Po\Yer to send its surface vessels to 
any part of the Mediterranean. 
VIII. Nothing in the present agreement in any \vay preju-
dices existing international engagements which have been 
registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. 
IX. If any of the participating Po,vers notifies its inten-
tion of withdrawing fron1 the present arrangement, the noti-
fication will take effect after the expiry of thirty days and 
any of the other participating Powers may withdraw on the 
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satne date if it connnunicates its intent ion to this effect be-
fore that date. 
Done at Nyon this fourteenth day of Septe1nber nineteen 
hundred and thirty seYen, in a single copy, in the English 
and French languages, both texts being equally authentic, 
and "·hich ,,ill be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat 
of the League of Nations. 
UNITED KINGDOn! OF 
GREAT BRITAIN AND 
XORTHERX IREL ... ~ND 
ANTH01\""Y EDEN 
BULGARIA 
G. Ivossirv~-L."oFF 
N. ~IO)ITCHILOFF 
EGYPT 
W ACYF BouTRos-GHALI 
H. AFIFI 
FRANCE 
Yvox DELBOS 
GREECE 
N. ~fAYROUDIS 
N. PoLITIS 
S. PoLYCHRONIADis 
RUn!ANIA 
'T ICTOR ~£\.XTONESCO 
TURKEY 
DR. R. ARAs 
UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
nfAxnrn Lrrv-IxoFF 
YUGOSL.A .. \TIA 
BoJIDAR PoURITCH 
In Yie'' thereof the undersigned, being authorized to this 
effect by their respective Governtnents, have met in con-
ference at Nyon between the 9th and the 14th Septe1nber 
1937, and haYe agreed upon the following provisions which 
shall enter inunediately into force: 
I. The participating Powers "·ill instruct their naval 
forces to take the action indicated in paragraphs II and III 
below with a \iew to the protection of all merchant ships 
not belonging to either of the conflicting Spanish parties. 
II. Any submarine which attacks such a ship in a 1nanner 
contrary to the rules of international law referred to in the 
I nternational Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of 
K a Yal Ar1naments signed in London on April 22, 1930, and 
confir1ned in the Protocol signed in London on N ove1nber 
6~ 1936, shall be counter-attacked and, if possible, destroyed. 
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III. The instruction mentioned in the preceding para-
graph shall extend to any sub1narine encountered in the 
vicinity of a position where a ship not belonging to either 
of the conflicting Spanish parties has recently been attacked 
in violation of the rules referred to in the preceding para-
graph in circumstances 'vhich give valid grounds for the 
belief that the subn1arine was guilty of the attack. 
IV. In order to facilitate the putting into force of the 
above arrangements in a practical manner, the participating 
Powers have agreed upon the following arrangements: 
1. In the western Mediterranean and in the Malta Chan-
nel, with the exception of the Tyrrhenean Sea, which may 
f_orm the subject of special arrangements, the British and 
French fleets 'vill operate both on the high seas and in the 
territorial waters of the participating Powers, in accord-
ance with the division of the area agreed upon bet,veen the 
t"'"'o Governments. 
2. In the eastern Mediterranean, 
(a) Each of the participating Powers 'vill operate in its 
own territorial waters; 
(b) On the high seas, with the exception of the Adriatic 
Sea, the British and French "fleets will operate up to the 
entrance to the . Dardanelles, in those areas where there is 
reason to apprehend danger to shipping in accordance with 
the division of the area agreed upon between the t'vo Gov-
ernments. The other participating Governments possessing 
a sea border on the Mediterranean, undertake, within the 
limit of their resources, to furnish these fleets any assistance 
that n1ay be asked for; in_ p~rticular2 they 'vilLper1nit the1n 
to take action in their territorial waters and to use such of 
....____ - . ----- --- -
their ports ~they shall indicate. 
3. It is further understood that the limits of the zones re-
ferred to in subparagraphs 1 and 2 above, and their alloca-
tion shall be subject at any time to revision by the partici-
pating Powers in order to take account of any change in 
the situation. 
V. The participating Powers agree that, in order to siin-
plify the operation of the above-mentioned n1easures, they 
'vill for their part restrict the use of their submarines in 
the ~1editerranean in the follo,ving manner : 
(League of Nations Docu1nent, C.409.NI.273.1937.VII) 
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AGREEl\IENT SUPPLEl\IENT.ARY TO THE NYON ARRANGEl\IENT, 
GENEVA, SEPTEl\IBER 17, 1937 
Whereas under the Arrange1nent signed at Nyon on the 
14th September, 1937, whereby certain collective measures 
were agreed upon relating to piratical acts by submarines 
in the l\fediterranean, the participating Powers reserved the 
possibility of taking further collective measures; and 
"Vhereas it is now considered expedient that such meas-
ures should be taken against si1nilar acts by surface vessels 
and aircraft ; 
In vie'v thereof, the undersigned, being authorized to this 
effect by their respective Governments, have met in confer-
ence at Geneva on the seventeenth day of September and 
have agreed upon the following provisions 'vhich shall enter 
imn1ediately into force: 
I. The present Agreement is supplementary to the Nyon 
.._~rrangement and shall be regarded as an integral part 
thereof. 
II. The present Agreement applies to any attack by a sur-
face Yessel or an aircraft upon any n1erchant vessel in the 
l\iediterranean not belonging to either of the conflicting 
Spanish parties, when such attack is accompanied by a vio-
lation of the humanitarian principles embodied in the rules 
of international law wit_h regard to warfare at sea, which 
are referred to in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 
22nd, 1930, and confirmed in the Protocol signed in London 
on November 6th, 1936. 
III. Any surface war vessel, engaged in the protection of 
merchant shipping in conformity 'vith the Nyon Arrange-
ment, which witnesses an attack of the kind referred to in 
the preceding paragraph shall : 
(a) If the attack is co1nmitted by an aircraft, open fire on 
the aircraft; 
(b) If the attack is co1nmitted by a surface vessel, inter-
vene to resist it within the limits of its powers, summoning 
assistance if such is available and necessary. 
In territorial '\Vaters each of the participating Po,vers con-
cerned 'viii give instructions as to the action to be taken by 
its o" .. n 'var vessels in the spirit of the present .A.greement. 
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Done at Geneva this seventeenth day of September 1937, 
in the English and French languages, both texts being 
equally authentic, in a single :copy which will be deposited 
in the archives of the Secretariat of the League of Nations. 
(League of Nations Document 0.409.M.273.1937.VII.) 
The submarine rules.-Submarine warfare and piracy 
were definitely linked together in the resolutions presented 
by Mr. Root at the Conference on Limitation of Armaments 
in Washington in 1922. As presented, Mr. Root's proposal 
sought to prohibit all use of submarines against merchant 
vessels and to attach the penalty of piracy to any such em-
ployment. As finally embodied in the unratified Treaty 
Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in 
Warfare, the destruction of merchantmen without prior 
visit, search, and placement of the personnel in safety was 
declared to be a violation of the laws of war subjecting 
any person in the service of any Power who should violate 
such a rule, whether or not such person is under orders of 
a governmental superior, to trial and punishment as if for 
an act of piracy. This conclusion was reached in spite of 
the consensus that it was not competent for the five Powers 
present at the Conference to establish new rules of inter-
nationalla w, including the branding of such action as piracy 
jure gentium. The decision 'vas also taken in spite of the 
:fact that only one delegate, Mr. Hanihara of Japan, raised 
a question as to the exact meaning of "punishment as if for 
an act of piracy," which was brusquely pushed aside by 
Mr. Hughes and Mr. Root who made no adequate answer 
and immediately cut off :further debate. "\Vhile the treaty 
'vas not ratified, it may be pertinent to point to the care-
fully studied observation in the comment on the Draft Con-
vention on Piracy of the Harvard Law School Research in 
International Law that "properly speaking * * * piracy 
is not a legal crime or offense under the law of nations." 
Part IV of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 invited 
states to accede to the proposition that according to inter-
national law submarines must confor1n to the rules of sur-
face craft, and that, except in case of resistance to visit and 
search, merchant vessels n1ust not be destroyed without first 
167533-40--8 
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placing the crew, passengers, and ship's papers in safety. 
Non -conformity by submarines was !lot branded an act 
of piracy, nor was any state authorized to bring to trial 
or to inflict the punishment for piracy upon the officers or 
cre'v of any sub1narine violating the rules. lVhile nine of 
the states invited to the N yon Conference had agreed to 
abide by the rules of this treaty, the Spanish Government 
had not done so. (N.J. Padelford, "Foreign Shipping dur-
ing the Spanish Civil "'\Var," American Journal of Inter- ~ 
national law, 1938, pp. 274-275.) 
LoNDON, N OVEl\IBER 6, 1936 
'Vhereas the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction 
of Naval Armaments signed in London on the 22nd April, 
1930, has not been ratified by all the signatories; 
And whereas the said treaty will cease to be in force after 
the 31st December, 1936, with the exception of Part IV 
thereof, which sets forth rules as to the action of submarines 
'vith regard to merchant ships a·s being established rules of 
international law, and remains in force without limit of 
time; 
And where as the last paragraph of Article 22 in the said 
Part IV states that the high contracting parties invite all 
other Powers to express their assent to the said rules; 
And whereas the Governments of the French Republic 
and the l{ingdom of Italy have confirmed their acceptance 
of the said rules resulting fron1 the signature of the said 
treaty; 
And whereas all the signatories of the said treaty desire 
that as great a number of Powers as possible should accept 
the rules contained in the said Part IV as established rules 
of international law; 
I'he undersigned, representatives of their respective gov-
ernments, bearing in mind the said Article 22 of the treaty, 
hereby request the Government of the United l{ingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland forthwith to communi-
en te the said rules, as annexed hereto, to the governments 
of all the Po,vers which are not signatories of the said 
treaty~ with an invitation to accede thereto definitely and 
'vi thout limit of time. 
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RULES 
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, sub-
lnarines must conform to the rules of international la\v to 
\vhich surface vessels are subject. 
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal 
to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to 
visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or sub-
marine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a 
merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, 
crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this pur-
pose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety 
unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in 
the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of 
land, or the presence of another vessel \V hich is in a position 
to take them on board. 
Signed in London, the 6th day of November, nineteen 
hundred and thirty-six. (British Treaty Series, No. 29, 
1936.) 
N o1~intervention and the Spanish civil strife.-
Soon after the outbreak of the fighting in Spain 
in July 1936, the European powers instituted the 
scheme of Non-Intervention. This was under-
taken primarily for political reasons, the outside 
states being_d~.sperately anxious to avoid involve-
ment_in the struggle. The ideological division be-
tween the Fascist powers supporting General 
Franco and those inclining to favor the established 
Tepublica11 government made the crisis acllte. It 
was feared that the rival groups outside might 
come into direct collisio11 as a result of their efforts .. 
to STip}Tly'- th-ei"ll-Spailisn f aYOrites \vith the sinews 
of war:--The Non-I11tervention schen1e took the __ _ 
form not of a comprehensive, binding international 
treaty, but rather of a series of exchanges of notes 
and of llnilateral don1estic acts whicl1 freqllently 
varied with one another bllt were generally pat-
) 
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terned alo11g the same lines. The 11ations partici-
pati11g in the arra11ge1nent undertook to foroiu the 
§ale of arms and implemeilts of war to either side. 
The Spanish rebels were thus placed llpon the same 
level as the so-called Loyalists, eve11 though there 
was no belligerency. The whole scheme was 
unique, and there has been nothi11g like it in the 
history of international law. li1 undertaking these 
special obligations, the British and French Gov-
ernments waived the right to assist the government 
they recognized in Spain. They did so hoping 
thereby to prevent Italy and Germany from giving 
governmental aid to the rebels, a right \vhich those 
two powers did not possess, at least not until they 
recognized General Franco as the legitimate ruler 
of Spain in N ove1nber 1936 after the Non-I11terven-
tioi1 plan had supposedly come into operation. 
To implement the Non-Interventio11 accord, a 
special Scheme of Observation \vas adopted in May 
1937. By its terms warships of Great Britai11, 
France, Italy; and Germany, \vere to patrol Span-
ish marginal seas in a zone extending from the 3-
mile limit outward for 7 miles. In addition, 
elaborate plans were made for observers to travel 
on the ships of third states going to Spain, the idea 
of all this being to check up on the sup~lies reach-
ing Spain and to report any infractions of the Oil-
Intervention accord to a central committee in Loll-
don. This patrol by war vessels was not a blockade 
in any sense of the word. The powers engaged 
~ \vere not at \var with Spain and were not taki11g 
reprisals. The patrol ships had 110 right of-visit 
a11d search, a11d no right to interfere \vith the ves-
sels of states 11ot parties to the Non-Intervention 
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agreement. A right of approach belo11ged to the 
patrol ships but they could not employ force to 
ascertain the true character of a vessel under sus-
picion which flew the flag of a non-signatory power. 
This situation presented delicate questions for 
international law. It was unique and went into 
·effect as a special scheme for a special state of 
affairs. The terms of the observation plan "\Vill be 
found in the appendix to this volume. 
(The non-intervention scheme) owes its inception to M. 
Blum of France and is founded upon an exchange of notes 
bet,veen Britain and France, August 15th, 1936, these notes, 
which 'vere substantially identical, contained reference to the 
establishment of a common attitude toward the Spanish strife, 
a preamble, and three declarations of policy. The preamble 
recited that the governments, deploring the events in Spain, 
l1ad decided to abstain r~gorously from all interference (de 
toute ingerence), direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of 
Spain, on the basis of the desire to avoid complications preju-
dicial to the good relations bet,veen their "Peoples." They 
then "declared": (1) they would prohibit the direct or in- -
direct exportation or reexportation of all "arms, munitions 
and materials of 'var as 'veil as all airplanes, mounted or 
dismantled, and all ships of war" from their territory to 
Spanish territories; (2) the prohibitions 'vould apply to con-
tracts in the process of execution ; ( 3) the governments would 
keep other governments participating in the mutual under-
standing ( cette entente) informed of the measures taken to 
carry out the prohibitions. The application of the declara-
tion 'vas made contingent upon the adherence of the other 
government, plus the governments of Germany, Italy, the 
Soviet Union, and Portugal. 
Twenty-seven governments eventually made si1nilar decla-
rations, in one form or another. However, the composition 
and contents of the notes varied so much it can hardly be said 
that all of the states declared their intention of doing iden-
tically the same things. Above all, it must be emphasized 
that there was no one instrtunent which all signed or adhered 
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to, in spite of constant e1nployn1ent of the tern1 "agreement." 
The agree1nent 'vas 1nerely a concert of policy, and its fulfill-
Inent depended entirely upon the initiative of each state. 
Analysis of the notes reveals that 15 (aside fron1 those of 
Britain and France) of the 27 repeated verbatin1 both the 
prea1nbulatory reasons for 1naking the declaration and the 
three basic declarations of policy. Between these states and 
France and Great Britain then, there ".,.as a community of 
policy on the steps to be taken and on the reasons for taking 
then1. 
The notes of six states repeated verbatim the three seriatin1 
declarations but on1itted the preamble. By o1nitting the pre-
amble these states left themselves free to engage in all forms 
of interference or intervention not specifically set forth in 
the first two declarations, while the seventeen others noted 
above agreed to refrain from all interference, direct or indi-
rect. Legally speaking, these six states restricted themselves 
less than did the others, and they are hardly to be condemned 
for allowing volunteers, officers, financial, and moral aid pass-
ing to Spain, public opinion and newspapers notwithstand-
ing. (N.J. Padelford, "The International Non-Intervention 
Agreement and the Spanish Civil War," American Journal 
of International Law, Oct. 1937, pp. 579-580.) 
The TJ1Lited States and Spa1~ish civil strife.-The 
American Government, acting independently, en-
acted legislation in harmony \vith the provisions of 
the European non-intervention sche1ne. On Jan-
uary 8, 1937 a special lavv of Congress made lin-
lawful the export of arms, annnunition, or imple-
ments of war to Spain during the existence of the 
state of civil strife. The so-called neutrality law 
of :Thfa·y 1, 1937, included a provision deali11g vvith 
civil strife and under that statutory author~zation 
the President proclaimed again ail embargo on 
armed shipments to Spain. The United States 
thus dealt impartially with both sides, despite the 
fact that \Ve were not really neutral, a status im-
possible without the existence of 'var. 
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Special act of Co1~gress in 1~egard to Spai1,~.-
JOINT RESOLUTION TO PROHIBIT THE ExPORTATION OF ARl\IS, 
Al\Il\IUNITION' AND ll\IPLEl\IENTS OF WAR FROl\I THE uNITED 
STATES TO SPAIN, JANUARY 8, 1937 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of A~erica in Congress assembled, That 
during the existence of the state of civil strife now obtain-
ing in Spain it shall, from and after the approval of this 
Resolution, be unla,vful to export arms, ammunition, or 
i1nple1nents of war from any place in the United States, or 
possessions of the United States, to Spain or to any other 
foreign country for transshipment to Spain or for use of 
either of the opposing forces in Spain. P .... rms, ammunition, 
or implements of war, the exportation of which is pro-
hibited by this Resolution, are those enumerated in the 
President's Procla1nation No. 2163 of April 10, 1936. 
· Licenses heretofore issued under existing law for the ex-
portation of arms, ammunition, or implements of war to 
Spain shall, as to all future exportations thereunder, ipso 
facto be de.e1ned to be cancelled. 
'Vhoever in violation of any of the provisions of this 
Resolution shall export, or attempt to export, or cause to 
be exported either directly or indirectly, arms, am1nunition, 
or imple1nents of war from the United States or any of its 
possessions, shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars 
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
'Vhen in the judgment of the President the conditions 
described in this Resolution have ceased to exist, he shall 
proclaim such fact, and the provisions hereof shall there-
upon cease to apply . 
. A.pproved, January 8, 1937, at 12.30 p. n1. (Public Reso-
lution, No. 1, 75th Cong.) 
Sections of the Act of JJfay 1) 1937.-
SEc. 1. " (c) Whenever the President shall find that a 
state of civil strife exists in a foreign state and that such 
civil strife is of a n1agnitude or is being conducted under 
such conditions that the export of arms, ammunition, or 
in1plements of war from the United States to such foreign 
state would threaten or endanger the peace of the United 
--
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· States, the President shall proclain1 such fact, and it shall 
thereafter be unlawful to export, or attempt to export, or 
cause to be exported, arms, ammunition, or implements of 
war from any place in the United States to such foreign 
state, or to any neutral state for transshipment to, or for the 
use of, such foreign state." 
"SEc. 10. 'Vhenever the President shall have issued a 
proclamation under the authority of section 1, it shall there-
after be unla ,vful, until such proclamation is revoked, for 
any American vessel engaged in commerce with any bellig-
erent state, or any state 'vherein civil strife exists, named in 
such proclamation, to be armed or to carry any armament, 
arms, ammunition, or implements of war, except small arms 
and ammunition therefor which the President may deem 
necessary and shall publicly designate for the preservation 
of discipline aboard such vessels." (Public Res. No. 27, 
75th Cong., ch. 146, 1st sess.) 
Proclamation in regard to ar1ns.-
Al\fERICAN VESSELS ENGAGED IN CO::\Il\fERCE 'VITH SPAIN 
Section 10 of the joint resolution of Congress approved 
~fay 1, 1937, amending the joint resolution approved August 
31, 1935, provides as follows: 
"SEc. 10. Whenever the President shall have issued a 
proclamation under the authority of section 1, it shall there-
after be unlawful, until such proclamation is revoked, for 
any American vessel engaged in commerce with any belliger-
ent state, or any state wherein civil strife exists, named in 
such proclamation, to be armed or to carry any armament, 
arms, ammunition, or implements of 'var, except small arms 
and ammunition therefor which the President may deen1 
necessary and shall publicly designate for the preservation 
of discipline aboard such vessels." 
Section 11 of the said joint resolution provides as follo,vs : 
"SEc. 11. The President may, from time to time, promul-
gate such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with la 'v, 
as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the pro-
visions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or 
authority conferred on him by this Act through such officer 
or officers, or agency or agencies, as he shall direct." 
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The President's proclamation of May 1, 1937, issued pur-
suant to the provisions of section 1 of the above-mentioned 
joint resolution provides in part as follows: 
"And I do hereby delegate to the Secretary of State the 
power to exercise any po,ver or authority conferred on me by 
the said joint resolution, as made effective by this my proc-
lamation issued thereunder, and the power to promulgate 
such rules and regulations not inconsistent with law as may 
be necessary and proper to carry out any of its provisions." 
In pursuance of those provisions of the law and of the 
President's proclamation of May 1, 1937, which are quoted 
above, the Secretary of State announces that American ves-
sels engaged in commerce with Spain may carry such small 
arms and ammunition as the masters of these vessels may 
deem indispensable for the preservation of discipline aboard 
the vessels. (Press Releases, Vol. 16, No. 396.) 
Attacks on foreign ships d~tri1~g Spa1tish civil 
strife.-During the Spanish conflict the ships of 
third states were frequently molested both inside 
and outside of territorial waters by surface ves-
sels, aircraft and submarines of the i11surgent and 
government forces. These attacks \Vere entirely 
unlawful and in many cases foreign powers have 
intervened both to protest sharply and to protect 
their shipping. Follovving are some instances of 
such unlawful attacks: 
The Nantucket Ohief.-Mr. T. Monroe Fisher, American 
vice consul at Palma de l\1allorca, reported to the Depart-
ment through the consulate at Marseille that he was in-
formed by local naval authorities of the seizure of the 
Nantucket Ohief on January 18, 1938, by Nationalist naval 
vessels. The ship is now under the control of a Nationalist 
naval officer. The manifest indicates that the vessel has 
a cargo of gasoline and kerosene shipped from a Russian 
port and destined for Barcelona. 
The crew numbers about 30, of whon1 about 27 are An1er-
ican citizens, 1 a Finnish citizen, and 2 British subjects. 
The American oil tanker 1.V antucket 0 hie f was seized by 
the naval forces of General Franco on the night of January 
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17, 1938, in latitude 40°45' N., longitude 3°45' E., approxi-
mately 48 miles north of the Balearic Islands and 80 miles 
southeast of the nearest point on the Spanish coast. At the 
time of seizure the tanker 'vas carrying a cargo of petroleum 
from the Russian Black Sea port of Tuapse to Barcelona, 
under charter to the Spanish petroleum monopoly. The 
vessel 'vas taken to Pabna de l\fallorca and the Captain, 
l\fr. J. E. Le,vis, 'vas taken ashore and imprisoned on J anu-
ary 26 on charges not kno,vn to the Department. 
The L'T antu.cket 0 h1~e f is a vessel of American registry, 
and the captain and n1ost of the crew are of American 
nationality. 
The Nantucket Ohief is o'vned by the Nantucket Chief 
Steamship Co., a corporation organized under the laws of 
the State of Delaware. 
Representations were Ina de informally to General Franco 
through the An1erican Ambassador to Spain, temporarily 
stationed at St. Jean de Luz, France, with a view to the 
in1n1ediate release of this A1nerican vessel, of the captain, 
and of the crew. 
The Department is now informed that the Nantucket 
0 hie f has left Palma de l\iallorca :for a mainland port or 
ports, and that after the discharge of its cargo the vessel 
and crew will be set at liberty. The Department is :further 
jn:forn1ed that Capt. J. E. Lewis, who is still in prison at 
Palma, will be released within a :few days. 
Consul T. l\fonroe Fisher at Palma has reported (Feb. 
10, 1938) to the Department of State that Capt. J. E. Lewis 
" .. as released and left Wednesday 1norning by plane :for 
Cadiz en route to l\tla1aga to join the LVantucket Ohief. He 
had been well treated 'vhpe in1prisoned. He had been 
slightly ill 'vith influenza and ""as given proper medical 
attention. 
Consul Leo J. Callanan at 1\tlalaga reported this afternoon 
that Captain Le,vis arrived at Malaga this morning and has 
restunecl charge of theN antucket Ohief. The Department of 
State has not yet received 'vord regarding the release of the 
ship although yesterday it did have a message giving the 
information that orders had been issued for the release of 
the ship. (Press Releases, Vol. X\TIII, Nos. 436, 437.) 
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The V. S. S. Kane.-The Secretary of State sent the fol-
lowing telegraphic instruction last night to the American 
Embassy at Madrid : 
"AMERIOAN EMBASSY, 
"Madrid, Spain. 
"AuGUST 30, 1936. 
"The United States Destroyer Kane left Gibralter at 8:12 
a. m. August 30, en route to Bilbao to assist in the 'vork 
of evacuating A1nerican nationals. According to report 
fro1n her Commanding Officer, at 4:10 p. m., August 30, 
'vhile the vessel was at 36 degrees, 33 minutes north and 
7 degrees, 35 minutes west (approximately 38 miles from the 
Spanish coast) an unidentified tri-motored, low winged 
monoplane flew over the Kane and dropped two bombs 
which exploded near the vessel. The Kane was flying the 
American flag at her foremast head and in addition had 
an American ensign horizontal on top of the well deck 
awning. When this attack was made, the Kane increased 
her speed to maneuver away from the plane. At 4: 25 p. m. 
the plane again flew over the Kane and dropped a third 
bomb. At 4:26 p. m. the Kane's anti-aircraft gun fired 
two rounds in the direction of the plane. At 4: 32 p. m. the 
plane again fle,v over the Kane and dropped three more 
bombs, making a total of six. The [{ ane's antiaircraft gun 
fired nine rounds in the direction of the plane during its 
approach and retreat. 
The attitude of the American Govern1nent in respect to 
the conflict in Spain is 'vell known. The American Govern-
ment has stressed the complete impartiality of its attitude 
and has publicly stated that, in conformity with its well 
established policy of non-interference with internal affairs 
in other countries, either in time of peace or in the event 
of civil strife, it will, of course, scrupulously refrain from 
any interference whatsoever in the unfortunate Spanish 
situation. 
"Since the Government forces in Spain have, in the friend-
liest spirit, made every possible effort to avoid injury to 
American nationals and An1erican property, it can only 
be assumed that the attack on the United States Destroyer 
f{ane, if made by a Government plane, ''as due to her 
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identity having been mistaken for a vessel of the opposing 
forces. Because of the friendly attitude of the Spanish 
Govern1nent toward the United States and the absence of 
any motive whatsoever for an attack upon an American 
vessel, it is not conceivable that a Govern1nent plane would 
knowingly make such an attack. The Alnerican Government 
feels confident that it is fully understood in every quarter 
that the sole purpose of the presence of American naval 
vessels about the shores of Spain is to afford facilities for 
the removal of .. A ..1nerican nationals from Spain. 
"Since the plane making the attack was unidentified, the 
President has directed that this incident be brought to the 
attention of the Spanish Government through you and in-
formally, 'vith no intention as to recognition, to the atten-
tion of General Franco through the American Consul at 
Seville, with the request that both sides issue instructions 
in the strongest ter1ns, as the American Government feels 
confident they 'viii desire to do, to prevent another incident 
of this character. 
"Take up this matter inunediately with the Spanish Gov-
ernment in the sense of the foregoing, endeavor to obtain a 
categorical statement as to whether the plane making this 
attack was a Govern1nent plane, and urge and insist upon 
definite assurance that appropriate instructions will imme-
diately be issued to the Governn1ent armed forces. Tele-
graph immediately and fully results of your representa-
tions." (Press Releases, Vol. XV, No. 363.) 
Attack in BritilJh waters.-The British Govermnent pro-
tested to General Francisco Franco today against the viola-
tion of British territorial waters by Insurgent vessels in 
their action against the Loyalist destroyer Jose Luis Diez on 
Dec. 30. Britain reserves the right to claim compensation 
for injuries to four British subjects injured by shell splin-
ters and damaged property. 
The holding of the destroyer by British authorities at 
Gibraltar is described here as unusual, although not irreg-
ular. The ship is not interned but her crew, having failed 
to remove her from British territorial waters within the 
period for which she received permission to stay, has been 
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repatriated. The ship remains i1nmobilized although pre-
sumably she 'vould be immediately handed over if the Span-
ish Government asked for her and arranged to remove her 
without violation of territorial waters. Such a possibility, 
however, seems remote at present. (New York Times, 
January 12, 1939.) 
The Wisconsin.-The American freighter Wisconsin, 
under command of Captain Hiram Taft, left Barcelona 
today for an undisclosed port, so it is no'v permissible to 
tell you how an armed Rebel trawler fired four shots at her 
off Gibraltar and tried to capture her. 
Captain Taft, who is a Yankee, has been carrying on a 
dangerous Spanish trade all the year through bombings, 
Piutinies and other 'dangers. He refused to halt when 
attacked and pushed straight ahead, for his ship's American 
flag was flying and he carried a legal cargo of lentils, rice 
and other food. 
It was a case of fortune favoring the brave, for the Rebel 
trawler developed engine trouble just at the crucial moment 
and had to abandon the chase. She signaled ahead to a 
Rebel cruiser, which, however, did not molest the Wisconsin. 
Captain Taft made a full report to the United States 
Consul at Barcelona, who in turn forwarded the information 
to the State Department. 
As Captain Taft told the 'vriter the story in the relative 
safety of a Barcelona hotel this is what happened: 
FRENCH VESSEL ATTACKED 
Eighty miles west of Gibraltar the 1V isconsin heard an 
S 0 S from a French ship en route to Brest, France, from 
Oran, Algeria, and in later messages learned that the French 
ship had been fired on, stopped and boarded by Spanish 
Rebels, who had started to take her to Ceuta, Spanish 
Morocco, when a French cruiser came to her aid. 
The Rebels then gave up their prey, but Captain Taft was 
heading for the same spot and foresaw trouble. He radioed 
to Gibraltar, asking if an American destroyer or cruiser 
were there, but received a negative reply. This was in the 
evening on Nov. 16. 
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At 1 A. ~1. the next day the radio officer informed Captain 
Taft that another French vessel had been captured and 
apparently had not been rescued. 
About 5 o'clock the same morning, the captain continued, 
"'vhen about five and one-half miles south southeast of 
Gibraltar, an armed trawler proceeded alongside, sweeping 
the 1V isconsin with a searchlight. At that time the Amer-
ican flag was flying from the flagstaff and huge American 
flags were painted on the vessel's sides. The tra,vler kept 
the searchlight on the flagstaff about two 1ninutes and the 
flag ''as open to windward. 
HALTS IN 1\IIDST OF ATTACK 
"The trawler proceeded ahead of the W iscon.s·in, fired a 
shot across the bow and ordered me to halt, which I refused 
to do. Then another shot was fired and this time it was not 
a blank for shrapnel whistled over me and the chief officer. 
Two more shots " .. ere fired, after which the trawler stopped, 
evidently because of engine trouble, but it 1rept flashing its 
searchlight in the air and then at the Wisconsin. 
"About ten minutes later we were swept by t'vo search-
lights from a Spanish Rebel cruiser which was lying to the 
east of the Strait. She kept one searchlight on the Amer-
ican flag about a minute but did not hail and I proceeded 
out of the Strait of Gibraltar.'' 
This was a typical incident of the Spanish trade. It is a 
hard, dangerous game but it has its rewards in money and 
excitement and, in Captain Taft's case, moral satisfaction 
for the wheat, beans, rice and n1edical supplies he has 
brought to Loyalist Spain ·on repeated trips are desperately 
needed. (New York Times, December 4, 1938.) 
11he Palos.-That the Fascist Bloc did not confer bel-
ligerent status upon the Spaniards by their (recognition) 
of the 19th of Noven1ber, 1936 "\Vas clearly manifested by 
the German treatinent of the Loyalist seizure of the steamer 
Palos, Decen1ber 24, supposedly en route from Hamburg to 
\Tigo, the German ship 'vas picked up by Basques in * * * 
the Bay of Biscay and taken in with 1,500 tons of "pro-
hibited freight" and t'vo Spanish insurgent agents on board. 
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The Ger1nan Gover1unent, in demanding the release of the 
ship, alleged ''the Palos was seized far outside the terri-
torial waters of the Spanish coast, namely 23 miles north-
east of Cape ~1achichaco. The captain of the Palos refused 
to sign a protocol according to which the Palos supposedly 
'vas seized five miles off the coast, although this alleged loca-
tion of seizure also lies outside the three mile limit and 
therefore outside the sovereign territory of Spain." The 
Basques denied that the arrest took place outside of their 
jurisdiction, but refused to specify exactly 'vhere it did 
occur. 
If the incident occurred where the Germans charged it 
did, it must be said that the vessel was in a strange location 
for a course Ha1nburg-Vi go. If the ship was seized five 
miles from the coast, the Spaniards might maintain that 
under their historic interpretation of the principle of juris-
diction in marginal waters-that is to say, out to six miles 
from the coast-they were acting correctly in seizing the 
German boat. 
If freedom of passage through marginal waters were de-
manded by Germany, it must be admitted that, while many 
believe there is a right of free passage in time of peace, the 
law is not entirely certain in this regard, and especially in 
time of quasi-peace such as prevails in Spain at the 1non1ent. 
'Vhatever may have been the locus of the seizure of the 
Palos~ and regardless of whatever merits there may have 
been in the seizure by the Spaniards in the first instance, 
Ger1nany de1nanded the release of the vessel, her cargo, and 
the Spanish subjects on board. Failing to secure the re-
lease of the contraband and the Spanish rebel passengers, the 
German cruiser Koenigsburg seized the 1,500-ton Spanish 
steamer L-lrgonne. on January 1, attempted to seize the 
ste~uner Soton January 2, and seized the steamer lJfarta Jttn-
quera January 4. The government communique justified the 
action in these words : 
"After the Red Rulers in Bilbao refused to surrender to 
the German cruiser K oenigsburg the passengers and part of 
the cargo retained from the steamer Pal()s, the German 
Government, as previously announced, saw itself compelled 
to enforce its den1ands through counter measures. In pur-
suit of this necessity to defend German sovereign rights 
·-
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against an act of piracy a Red Span ish steamer has been 
seized provisionally by the Gern1an naval forces in Spanish 
waters." 
The loyalists were warned that if their demands were 
not met by January 8, "the Spanish steamers and their car-
goes will be utilized by the Ger1nan Government in their 
account with the Spanish Governn1ent recognized by it. In 
case of repetition of acts of piracy against German n1erchant 
vessels, the German Government will be compelled to take 
further Ineasures." The vessels 'vere turned over to the 
rebels on the failure of the Basques to hand over the goods 
and passengers. 
The tenor of the German ulti1nata and the reprisals taken 
indicate clearly that the Reich did not recognize that the 
Spaniards possessed belligerent rights. Not enjoying such 
rights respecting German vessels on the high seas, the Ger-
n1ans were quite within bonds in their demands and, failing 
to secure them, in taking such reprisals as seemed a quid pro 
quo for the tort committed. (N. J. Padelford, "Interna-
tional Law and the Spanish Civil War," American Journal 
of International Law, April, 1937, pp. 237-239.) 
British policy in regard to attacks.-The British Govern-
tnent has made it abundantly clear that it does not regard the 
existence of civil war in Spain as conferring license upon any 
Spanish forces to interfere with British shipping on the high 
seas, and that it will not tolerate even such interference as 
the visiting of British ships in order to establish their charac-
ter. Still less, of course, does it tolerate any more violent 
interference, and the British Navy has orders to afford pro-
tection to all British shipping against attack upon unarmed 
1nerchantmen provided they are its o'vn. It has persistently 
advanced the principle that internationalla'v no less than the 
dictates of humanity and civilization forbids such attacks 
even in time of war * * * 
It is no justification of these crimes to plead that neither 
Spanish Governn1ent has acceded to the Proces-Verbal 
adopted by the rest of the ""oriel; or that since they are not 
accorded the belligerent right of visit and search of merchant 
ships at sea, kno,ving that their enemies' ships are using false 
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colors, they have no alternative but to attack at sight. A new 
government seeking recognition does not recommend itself to 
the 'vorld by flouting the principles adopted by the world, 
even on the plea tl~at its rival has not formally adopted them; 
and even the accordance of belligerent rights would not carry 
license to subject the ships even of the rival Governn1ent in 
its ow·n country to the treatment inflicted of late upon all and 
sundry * , * *. (London Times, August 18, 1937.) 
The observation sche1ne a1~d visit and search.-
In part (a) of Situation III the cruiser Fona of 
state F is functioning in a double capacity: it is 
a patrol ship unde~ the Observation scheme and it 
is a national "\varship which has the duty to protect 
the commerce of state F. ·Though the Ferart is vio-
lating both the Non-Intervention scheme and the 
domestic law of st~te F, since it is carrying aircraft 
to state B, the Cape, the cru~ser of the Commoners, 
possesses no rights of visit and search. Enforce-
ment of the domestic legislation and of the special 
schen1e by which the Feran is bound, is not the 
f 
function of an insurgent warship whose actions 
must be controlled entirely by international law. 
As pointed out above, ins'urgent craft have none of 
the rights of belligerents at sea and any interfer-
ence with the Feran is illegal. It is for the Fona 
to warn the master of the Feran that the latter is 
infringing upon the special rules, and it is the duty 
of the Fo1La to protect the Fera1~ from any inter-
nationally illegal molestation. A cruiser of the gov-
ernment B since it is a "\Varship of a recognized 
power, would have the right to approach the Fera1~ 
(The Marianna Flora, 11 vVheaton, 1) but it would 
have no authority to visit and search, so that its 
rights would not differ greatly from those of the 
Gape. 
167533-40-9 
--
122 CIVIL STRIFE 
I11 part (c) the Gyra is violating no law, either 
domestic or international, and ·is engaged upon a 
perfectly lawful voyage. Oil is not a commodity 
'v hich con1es under the heading of ''Arms, Ammuni-
tion and In1plements of War'' and thus was not 
prohibited by the Non-Intervention plan or by the 
domestic law of state G. The carrying of arms by 
the Gyra for the preservation of discipline was law-
ful. (See Sec. 10 of the American law above.) 
Lil{e the Cape in part (a) the Bai1~ had no right to 
sun1mon the Gyra to come to for visit and search. 
It is incumbent on the Ge1Lo, the cruiser of state G, 
to come to the Gyra's assistance and to drive off 
the Bai1~ by force if necessary. The Ge1~o would 
have no right, if it arrives too late to save the Gyra, 
to make a counter-attack upon the Bai1~, either 
under general international law or the special 
Geneva Arrangement. Warships summoned to aid 
merchant vessels are limited to the use of force for 
"preventive" purposes, not for punitive. Force 
"can never be exercised with a view to inflicting 
punishment. Retaliation for acts already commit-
ted is not allowable.'' (United States Navy Regu-
lations, Art. 723.) . Where submarines were con-
cerned, the Nyon accord permitted counter-attacks 
for purposes immediately punitive but ultimately 
preventive. Under the .. Geneva accord the cruiser 
of state H, if it actually witnessed the attacl\: by 
the Bai1~, could intervene to protect the merchant 
vessel to the best of its ability. 
Resistance to illegal visit and search.-Even if 
there had been belligerency the Bain would have 
had no right to sink the Gyra merely because the 
latter resisted visit and search. If a summoned 
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vessel resists or takes to flight it may be pursued 
and brought to by forcible means if necessary. 
The United States regarded resistance or flight as ground 
for using :force sufficient to cause the merchant vessel to lie 
to * * * but not a ground :for sinking the vessel. O:f 
course the * * * vessel might be sunk in the exercise of 
the right, but the use o:f :force was held to be restricted to that 
necessary to bring the vessel to, and :forcible resistance by 
the merchant vessel was not in itself a ground :for sinking (it) 
but a just ground :for its condemnation. (Naval 'Var College 
Situations, 1934, p. 50.) 
Section 4295 U. S. Revised Statutes: The commander and 
cre'v * * * may oppose and defend against any aggres-
sion * * * by any armed vessel * * * not being a 
public armed vessel o:f some nation in amity with the United 
States. 
As the action of the Bai.1~ was entirely illegal, 
the Gyra had the right to resist, though such action 
in the face of overwhelming force may have been 
somewhat quixotic. Orders issued by the United 
States authorities enjoin resistance to illegal visit 
and search, even by a recognized government. 
(Naval War College Situation 1912, p. 27.) It is 
true that the arms on board the Gyra were there 
"for the preservation of discipline" and resistance 
to legal visit and seareh would have been un-
justifiable, for the Gyra would then be an armed 
merchantman. In the light, however, of the prac-
tice and orders concerning illegal interference, it 
seems reasonable to declare the Gyra's resistance a 
legal, though perhaps a foolish, act. 
Illegal attacks by subrnarin.e.-In part (b) the 
Iris with its cargo of barbed wire was breaking no 
domestic or international law. Any possible in-
fraction of the Non-Intervention scheme need not 
be considered because state I was not a party to 
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that arrangen1ent. The submarine acted illegally 
whether it encountered the Iris inside or ot1tside 
the 3-mile limit. Within territorial \Vaters a sub-
marine, disclosi11g its iaentity, would have the right 
to stop the Iris and to direct it but in no circum-
stances to destroy it. Outside the 3-Inile limit a 
properly marked sub1narine of state B might ap-
proach the Iris but it could not visit and search.it 
.or order its destruction. Visit and search by the 
~established government or b~y the rebels during 
insurge11cy is illegal. (Naval War College Sit-
-uation, 1912, pp. 21-24; 2 Moore, "International 
.Arbitrations,'' pp. 1021.) 
Even if the situation had been one of belliger-
ency, the I r£s could not legally have been ordered 
about i11 this fashion. The submarine should have 
shown its flag and should have visited and searched 
the Iris before ordering destruction. According 
to the London rules of 1930 there could be no 
destruction of the merchant ship, even if the lives 
of those on board were saved, unless the ship had 
been captured, and the1~ it could have been de-
stroyed only if taking it into a port wot1ld have 
involved danger to the submarine and if the ship's 
papers had been placed in safety. (See also Arts. 
49 and 50 of the Declaration of London, 1909.) 
Thus on every cot1nt the sub1narine \Vas guilty of 
unlawful action. The Nyon arra11gement \Vas de-
signed to meet just such a situation as this, and 
though the ship's person11el \Vas given a chance 
for safety, the submarine was attacking "in a man-
11er contrary to the rules of i11ternational law 
referred to'' in the London Treaty of 1930 and the 
Protocol of 1936. Whereas normally the I ona 
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would have the right to employ only preventive 
force to protect the Iris) as a warship of a state 
signatory to the Nyon treaty it may use force be-
yond that which is actllally needed to save the !Tis 
and may counter-attacl{ the submarine. This was 
the special grant of authority in the Nyon conven-
tion which vvas drafted with a vie\v to halting 
attacl{s made in an illegal manner, attacks per-
formed by legal methods being left subject to the 
general rules which pern1it preve11tive force by the 
protecting warship of a merchant vessel's own 
state. The cruiser of State H like\vise should in-
tervene to attack the submarine. A submarine of 
the Commoners or of state D acting in similar 
illegal fashion would be subject to the sa1ne drastic 
treatment. 
What const~·tutes an ((attack. JJ_N o actual firing 
of a projectile or sinking of a ship has to take place 
for an act or a series of acts to constitute an "at-
tack." In this instance it is not necessary to 
vvait until the torpedo is launched before the sub-
marine can be considered to l1ave attacked the Irrt·s. 
The \vord ''attack'' covers 111ore than the mere em-
ployment of force. To reascm otherwise would 
be to go counter to a11 the dictates of law and com-
mon se11see A threat can be an attack just as vvell 
as the carrying out of that threat, and the notice 
to the I rris in this case 1nay be likened to an ''as-
sault" in domestic law. 
It is not essential in order to constitute a wrong that the 
'vrongdoer shall have fully carried out his intention nor that 
any actual damage shall result * * * (he is) liable if 
his conduct 'vas such as reasonably created in the plaintive 
the belief that such ability and intent existed. (A. B. Hall, 
"Elementary Law Manual," p. 52.)' 
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Resurne.-lt1 times of civil strife when there is 
no recognition of belligerency, the merchant ships 
of third states are not subject to visit and search 
on tl1e high seas and it is tl1e duty of war vessels 
of those states to protect their nations' merchant 
shipping from interference. Within territorial 
waters a parent state, in cases of insurgency, may 
close a port provided it does so "effectively," and 
the rebels too "\vithin the 3-mile limit may prevent 
supplies from reaching their domestic adversaries. 
These are the rules for the usual instances of in-
surgency. In particular cases, like that of Spain 
recently, and that of state B in Situation III, for-
eign po,vers may adopt special n1easures like those 
of Non-Intervention, the American legislation on 
civil strife, and the Nyon and Geneva arrange-
ments. Such actions, however, are based not upon 
international law, but upon consideration of poli-
tics and expediency at the moment. In this situa-
tion, therefore, the cruisers F onaJ I onaJ and Geno 
are obligated to employ force against the cruisers 
and submarines which are making unwarranted 
attacks upon innocent (at least insofar as interna-
tional law is concerned) merchant ships. Special 
rights attach to the cruisers of I and H under the 
Geneva and Nyon Conventions, and the cruisers 
of F and G, in addition to protecting ships of their 
fellow nationals, have special duties under the Non-
Intervention scheme of Observation. The rules 
of the usual law and the stipulations of these new 
and uniq~e conventions comb]ne to form the basis 
for the solution. 
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SOLUTION 
(a) The Fona should notify the Feran that it 
is corning to its aid to protect it against an illegal 
act. The Fona also should notify the Gape that 
the latter has no right to interfere with the Feran 
and should threaten the use of force against the 
Gape if it refuses to desist. The rights would be 
the same if the summons had been by a cruiser of 
state 13. · 
(b) The I on a should notify the Iris to try to 
escape and should notify the submarine that it has 
no rights in this situation and that force will be 
used against it for the protection of the Iris. If 
the I ona arrives before the Iris is actually attacked 
it should drive off the submarine by force, and if 
it reaches the place of attack too late to save the 
Iris, it should counter-attack the submarine. The 
rights would be the same if the submarine had been 
under the flag of the _Commoners or that of state D. 
(c) The Geno should notify the Gyra to cease 
its resistance and should notify the Bain that the 
latter has no right either to visit and search or to 
sink the Gyra and should threaten force to compel 
it to desist. The rights would be the same if the 
summons was by a cruiser of the Commoners. 
The cruiser of state H should take no action in 
the case of the Feran. In the case of the Iris, it 
may intervene and may counter-attack and de-
stroy the submarine. In the case of the Gyra, if 
it witnessed the attack, it may intervene to protect 
the Gyra but has no authority to counter-attack 
or destroy the Bain. 
